"Because of Spain, we knew ten times more than any of the other guys" 1 War underwent a profound political, technological and social transformation in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. One of the key elements in this transformation was the relationship between war and society. On the one hand, in "total war", civilians became a strategic military target, which would explain the high number of civilian victims in the armed conflicts of the first half of the 20 th century. 2 On the other hand, there had been mass mobilization of civilians by national armies since the end of the 18th century. This gave rise to two, apparently contradictory, phenomena: the massive conscription of civilians and the rise of the volunteer soldier. 3 As states sought to strengthen patriotic feelings and border control, the phenomenon of transnational soldiers began to appear. These were men and women who fought, either voluntarily or under duress, for other countries but with different motives to those of mercenaries. 4
"With guerrillas like Tschapaieff (…) the Bolsheviks won their civil war, the Chinese defend themselves with guerrillas and we must win this war with guerrillas". 8 Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Bayo, later a guerrilla warfare instructor for Fidel Castro and "Che" Guevara, expressed himself with such conviction in a pamphlet entitled "It will be a guerrilla war". Bayo aimed to convince the Republican Army's general staff in October 1937 that they should double their efforts with regard to guerrilla warfare. "For 16 months of fighting we have worked hard with only a very small number of guerrillas as we have not acknowledged the importance of this policy or method of waging war". 9 Bayo's report was accurate. Since the start of the war the Republicans had implemented guerrilla operations but not in a systematic or organized manner.
This was mainly due to the crisis facing the Republican Army. The Spanish Civil War had started with a military coup, which led to a territorial and internal fracturing of the Spanish Army. Only a small number of officers stayed loyal to the government of the Second Republic. At the same time, workers' organizations created their own paramilitary groups (armed militias) which competed with the remains of the Republican Army for the control of violence practices. During the first months of the war the Republican government faced an enormous challenge:
to create a "popular army" to integrate both loyal officers and the autonomous armed militias. 10 Staff for the defence of Madrid, officially ordered the creation of the first guerrilla units, 16 while, in January 1937, the president of the government, Francisco Largo Caballero, approved a plan to create guerrilla units within the Republican Army throughout the territory. 17 The process of militarization of the guerrilla units continued until February 1938 when the new elite corps (initially named Special Service Groups and later, Guerrilla Battalions), trained in guerrilla schools, were formed. 18 The final stage, between February 1938 and March 1939, was the consolidation of guerrilla groups with the creation of the 14 th Corps. This new elite unit, directed by Domingo Ungría, later to become a Red Army guerrilla in the Soviet Union during WWII, was integrated into the Republican Army. 19 Consisting of six divisions, its three main objectives were to: 1) obtain information on the enemy (intelligence), 2) destroy transport and communication infrastructure, military installations, etc. (sabotage) and 3) cause a popular uprising in the enemy rearguard (through propaganda and subversion). 20 However, it did not reach its peak of organization, training and experience until the Republican Army was practically defeated.
The slow pace of implementation of guerrilla warfare in the Republican Army was due to four key factors: 1) the complexity of creating a new popular army incorporating both professional soldiers and members of the militias; 2) the opposition of some Spanish military officers to the creation of guerrilla units; 21 3) the poor tactical level of the obsolete Spanish Army; 22 and 4) the lack of relevant military experience of the majority of the Republican soldiers and officers. 23 As a result, although some of the international volunteers lacked military experience, they made a notable contribution to the Republican Army. The Comintern's guidelines emphasized the importance of recruiting people with military experience. However, this requisite varied according to country and date. 24 This lack of consistency in recruitment resulted in a heterogeneous selection of international volunteers. For instance, most of the Polish volunteers lacked any military knowledge and only 34% of the Americans had had any kind of formal military experience. 25 In contrast, others had fought in the First World War, the Russian Civil War or in colonial wars, particularly the volunteers from Germany and Bulgaria. 26 However, the Soviet contribution was the largest. It is believed that the Soviet Union sent around 4000 people to work in the Republican Army, of whom directly involved in the development of guerrilla warfare in Spain but the profiles of some of these advisors show the great interest of the Soviets in this field.
Although the extent to which General Alexander Orlov was involved in the promotion of guerrilla warfare in Spain is controversial, he undoubtedly put his long experience at the disposal of the Republican Army. 28 A more important part was played by advisors and instructors such as Naum Eitingon, Hajji-Umar Mamsurov, Kristofors Intovich Salniņš, Grigory Semyonov, Ilyá Starinov, Grigory Syroyezhkin, Guy Lazarevich Tumanian and Stanislav Vaupshasov, among others.
In addition to their Soviet military academy training, they had experience of guerrilla warfare in the Russian Civil War, the Polish-Soviet War and the Chinese Civil War. 29 Eitingon, Orlov's deputy in Spain, was, according to his superior, "the man most responsible for developing the strategy for commando raids in modern times, and (…) the Spanish Civil War was the testing ground for the tactic long before the Second World War". 30 The film Chapaev, based on the exploits of Soviet partisans in the Russian Civil War, was viewed with great enthusiasm by the Spanish and international soldiers who served in Spain. The US International Brigader Mito Kruth wrote to his wife after seeing the film in Spain: "We too will be little Chapayevs in our small way". 31 These new "Chapayevs" were trained in special schools, the most 27 would find support among the population and that the guerrilla nuclei active since the end of the war would act as a base for the operation. 55 However, the ambiguous position of Franco, who declared himself to be non-belligerent while collaborating with the Axis powers, made the British and US governments wary, particularly their diplomats in Madrid. It was thus decided that there would be no intervention in Spain for the moment, although they began to draw up plans in case they were needed. 56 In order to organize intelligence and sabotage units, Donovan needed to set up schools for training in guerrilla warfare. In August 1941 he had already requested help from the British to create a school, but not on US soil so as not to compromise their neutrality. Just two days after the attack on Pearl Harbour the British opened Camp X in Canada. During a period of more than two years around 500 British, US and Canadian students passed through the school. 57 However, the Japanese attack had altered the situation. Donovan now wanted a we were supposed to be doing were at best foggy and at worst erroneous." 62 The most worrisome aspect was British and American instructors´ lack of knowledge about guerrilla warfare. According to one of the early students in Area B:
"Lectures on guerrilla warfare" were taught "by senior officers who had never seen this type of operation, or combat either for that matter. They taught it by the book, apparently an old Army manual". 63 Felsen. 65 In that sense, in addition to transferring their knowledge as instructors, Aalto and Goff also recommended the translation of manuals on guerrilla warfare that they had studied in Spain, such as On Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse-Tung or the Soviet Russian Guerrilla Manual. 66 Both were translated from Russian to English thanks to a curious collaboration between two other transnational soldiers: the former Soviet General Alexander Barmine, who had fled the Soviet Union in 1933, and the Russian Prince Serge Obolensky, who was also a refugee in the US having belonged to the White Army. "There was nothing else in those days and we had to create it"-admitted Felsen. 67 The school improved over the following months with the development of an ambitious syllabus involving intelligence and guerrilla warfare. The students learned to handle weapons from different European countries; how to use different types of explosives (dynamite, Molotov cocktails, etc.) to blow up train tracks, bridges and buildings; parachute rigging and jumping; close-combat techniques; radio communication, etc. 68 The veterans combined the roles of advisors and students in this second stage as they were learning techniques they had not come across in Spain, such as parachuting. 69 The school set up new training camps named Areas A, C, D and F, which specialized in different subjects.
The school was notable for being transnational from its inception. On March 25 th 1942 the Secretary of War decreed that "aliens and foreign nationals" could become officers in the US Army after passing through Area B where they were trained to lead "ethnic" raider units. 70 plans concerning Operation Torch were provisionally rejected. 76 The US and Britain, fearing that, after the liberation of North Africa, Hitler would invade Spain to take Gibraltar and Spanish Morocco needed to be prepared for this contingency. This required them to be prudent so as not to alter the precarious balance of Franco's policy of non-belligerence. 77 While the group was awaiting its definitive orders Aalto was expelled.
Years later, Felsen admitted that Aalto had been reported by his own comrades from the International Brigades and the CPUSAE. Following a night when Aalto had openly shown his homosexuality by going to a hotel with a US sailor his companions went to Donovan's office to report him. According to Felsen, Donovan "seemed genuinely sorry to hear about Aalto, whom he liked and admired, but he assured us we had by all means done the right thing." 78 The homophobia of his comrades and the US Army thus prevented perhaps the biggest US expert on guerrilla warfare from taking part in any mission with the OSS during WWII. 79 After the expulsion of Aalto, the group received three new members: Mike Jiménez, a former member of the International Brigades who was in charge of guerrilla communications in Spain, his brother James, 80 and Captain Jerry Sage, an ex-football star, who became the military leader of the group supervised by Downes. 81 The unit was finally given a mission: to go to North Africa "to establish an OSS unit as an integral part of the G2 of an army in the field". 82 Most of Downes' group were members of the CPUSA and the PCE and it was thus natural that they relied on the networks they trusted. The unit had managed to make contact with the clandestine PCE in North Africa in February was based on a simple method whereby the PCE first drew up a list of the comrades they deemed most suitable for service in an OSS unit. Next, Downes' group searched for them in the concentration camps and secured their release. 98 Using this method, sixty men from at least eight camps in French Morocco and Algeria were recruited in the first two months. They were then organized into groups of radio telegraph operators, guerrilla fighters and the intelligence service. 99 However, this collaboration was based on mutual mistrust. The Spanish communists were wary of the OSS despite having comrades in their ranks while the OSS distrusted the communists. Nevertheless, both felt they had something to gain from this collaboration at the start of 1943. 100 Downes' group were assigned to Massingham, a joint project of the SOE and OSS in Algiers, which opened in February 1943 and became the main command hub and training centre for special operations into southwestern Europe. The Spanish combatants recruited in the concentration camps were the first students and they "reflected the diversity of the world coalition against fascism". 101 In Massingham special agents of many nationalities were trained, but, as T.C. Wales emphasized, this pluralism was far from idyllic, leading to discord and cultural misunderstandings. Major Peter Murray Lee, the British officer sent to Massingham to take charge of security at the school, was horrified to see "tiny hens (…) Spanish communist (…) -none of them were more than five feet tall"-, who "saluted with a closed fist". 102 As a result, Downes applied to set up his own schools to train the Spanish combatants. Downes' group had the necessary training. Thus, in March 1943, Mike Jiménez and his brother opened a communications school in Bainen Falaise, on the outskirts of Algiers. Thanks to the accounts of some of the students it is known that they studied radio reception and transmission, cryptography, security, intelligence, clandestine work, weapons handling and landings. 103 According to Downes, the quality of the school directed by the International Brigades veterans was higher than that of Massingham and consequently "other OSS desks were begging us to take their students". 104 Downes' assertion may simply have been an exaggeration motivated by the context of strong competition that existed between the American and British military in North Africa at that time. 105 The SOE syllabus in communications of September 1943, produced just six months after the opening of Downes' School, displays a high level of knowledge in the subject. 106 114 However, in June 1943, due to the success of these services, the G2 of the Fifth Army took the decision to authorize Downes' activities on the Spanish mainland. 115 They designed a plan of infiltration, named Operation Banana, with the intention of establishing a network of intelligence and radio operators along the Mediterranean coast of Spain (Málaga, Cartagena, Cádiz, Algeciras, Barcelona) and Madrid. The operation was named Banana after the code name for Málaga, the city to which the first unit would be sent. 116 When Downes relayed the news to the Spanish and International Brigades veterans in Oujda there was an explosion of joy. They had been waiting four years for the opportunity to again fight fascism in Spain. 117 The team made two landings on the Málaga coast between June and September 1943. Each of these permitted the infiltration of three Spanish combatants trained at the schools in Algiers and Oujda: a pilot, a radio-telegraph operator and an intelligence agent. All six were members of the PCE and carried two machine guns, revolvers, two radio transmitters and a small sum of money.
They also managed to infiltrate some agents through the border with Morocco and thence to the mainland. Communication between Málaga and Algeria started in July. Reports by radio were received in an office at the school in Oujda where they were translated from Spanish into English and sent to the G2. The information involved military positions, weapons and recruits in the Francoist army but was scarce and vague. The PCE had given other codes to the radio operators so they could send unofficial reports to the party, bypassing the OSS.
The six agents encountered enormous difficulties as the PCE network in Málaga was virtually non-existent and they did not have the resources required to survive in secrecy. 118 For the first landing Downes' group received help from Colonel William Eddy and Colonel Arthur Roseborough, who primed the British and US naval authorities. In fact, the first group was taken out to sea by the Prodigal, a boat belonging to the SIS. 119 In contrast, the second group had to confront the authorities. Operation Banana had come to the attention of the British intelligence services, who reported it to the Foreign Office. 120 The British and US ambassadors in Spain, Samuel Hoare and Carlton Hayes, along with Robert Murphy were three enemies of clandestine operations in Spain. They demanded that the operation be cancelled. According to Downes, the British Foreign Office ordered that "no British vessels are to take any further clandestine landings to Spain". 121 Consequently, the group decided to act autonomously and create their own "naval army" to carry out the operation. As there were a large number of Spanish Republican sailors in North Africa the group bought a boat and repaired it with their help. The first two attempts to embark were detected and stopped by British security, but, on September 23 rd , they were able to escape detection and transport the Spanish agents to Spanish territory. 122 This change of policy responded to the new scenario of the war in southern Europe, the centre of Allied operations since the liberation of North Africa. The fear of the German invasion of Spain had disappeared and Italy was now the priority. The invasions of Sicily and Corsica were planned in North Africa and the Allied central office needed the best special operations unit: Downes' group. Goff, "one of the world's most accomplished and renowned guerrillas", 123 and Lossowski were ordered to recruit 75 Italian and American agents for the operation. 124 They eventually organized a group of 90 men, which included several of the Spanish recruits who had trained in the US and Algeria. The unit was sent to Sicily, from where it took part in the landing at Salerno on September 9 th 1943. 125 Downes' group established the OSS Fifth Army Headquarters in Amalfi in immediately. Donovan appointed Downes as head of the OSS in Italy until he was replaced by Colonel Ellery C. Huntington Jr. in October 1943, while Goff and Lossowski's group were assigned to intelligence fieldwork. Donovan himself joined the group a few days before the invasion of Naples. 126 After the landing on the Italian mainland, Goff and Lossowski were assigned to the 3 rd and 34 th Divisions respectively in order to recruit, organise, equip and train the first six Operational Groups in Italy. 127 In the next two months, Goff and Lossowski "were almost continuously with 'combat teams' at front doing the work which proved to be our real 'entry ticket' to the Fifth Army show." 128 blowin' up railroads (…) He says: 'But in your connection, make sure the Communist Party doesn`t come out ahead'. I said, 'That's valid. They're out to win the war, we're out to win the war. I'll do the best I can to win this war'. He said fine, and left." 130 Meanwhile, in North Africa, the Spanish communists made the most of the training, infrastructure and weapons provided by the OSS and continued with the plans for Operation Banana independently. In November 1943 they managed to secretly send a new expedition with 5 machine guns and two radio transmitterreceivers. However, in February 1944 the Francoist police arrested all the agents who had arrived since July. 131 The PCE also created its own guerrilla training school in North Africa using the combatants trained by the Americans as instructors. Their aim was to infiltrate ten guerrilla fighters in Spain every two months from North Africa. However, between 1944 and 1946 they were only able to organize three landings of ten men each time. 132 Infiltration through the Pyrenees was much more significant over the next few years, although the lack of 
